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Measuring  the  Average 
Marginal Tax  Rate from the 
Individual Income  Tax 
In order to assess the economic effects of taxa- 
tion, we have to know the applicable marginal 
tax rates for individuals or businesses. For ex- 
ample, marginal  tax rates on income affect deci- 
sions to work, produce, save, and invest. How- 
ever, the readily available data refer to totals of 
tax collections in various categories, such as in- 
dividual income taxes, corporate profits taxes, 
and so on. From these figures, we can construct 
measures  of average tax rates. But, especially in 
the case of the graduated  rate federal individual 
income tax, these measures  do not tell us directly 
the fraction  of income that the "representative" 
person gets to keep at the margin. Therefore, 
average tax rates may not provide an adequate 
basis for determining the allocative effects of 
taxation. 
There  have  been  some  attempts-notably 
Joines (1981)  and Seater (1982)-to  use more de- 
tailed data to  compute average marginal tax 
rates. Basically, for the federal  individual  income 
tax, they look across classes of adjusted gross 
income from the IRS data to see how taxes paid 
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per return  vary with income per return.  They then use the ratio of the 
change  in taxes per return  to the change in income per return  to calcu- 
late marginal  tax rates. Generally-as  Joines and Seater argue is ap- 
propriate-this  concept of a marginal  tax rate is substantially  smaller 
than the explicit rate from the tax schedule. But, as we discuss later, 
there  are problems  in interpreting  their  concept of a marginal  tax rate  in 
terms of the underlying  substitution  effects on individuals'  choices. In 
fact, we argue that the explicit rate from the schedule is the right 
concept for many purposes.1 
In the present paper we focus on the federal individual  income tax. 
This category is interesting  for several reasons. First, it is large-46% 
of federal and 30%  of total government  revenues in 1980. Second, the 
appropriate  disaggregated  data are available. Third, because of the 
graduated  rate structure,  the differences  between marginal  and average 
tax rates are likely to be important.  However, a full measure of mar- 
ginal  tax rates would incorporate  other  levies, some of which are based 
on property or expenditures rather than on income. We do plan to 
include soon the social security tax,2 which constitutes 26%  of federal 
and 17%  of total government  revenues in 1980. We may also consider 
other types of taxes, but even the full array of these would not be 
sufficient.  That is because a full concept of a marginal  tax rate encom- 
passes also the transfers that people lose when they earn additional 
income. Thus far, we have no plans to tackle this issue. 
Theoretical  Considerations 
We set up a simple model to deal with the following  question:  What  is 
the appropriate  concept of a marginal  tax rate in the context of an 
income tax that, first, has a graduated  rate structure and, second, 
allows for numerous  legal and illegal deductions in the calculation  of 
1. Protopapadakis  (1982) also uses the Joines-Seater  approach  to calculate average 
marginal  tax rates for capital  gain income. Earlier,  Wright  (1969)  used the explicit  rates 
from  the tax schedule  to calculate  average  marginal  tax rates for interest  and dividends 
over the period 1913-58. Except for his weighting  by amounts  of interest  and dividend 
income, Wright's  approach  seems to accord with the one that we emphasize in this 
paper. 
2. The important  considerations  are, first, distinguishing  the self-employed  from em- 
ployees; second, allowing  for the tax deductibility  of employer  contributions;  and, third, 
ascertaining  the fraction of persons (and their incomes) whose earnings exceed the 
ceiling  amount.  Joines (1981, p. 199)  estimates  the last element  from the distribution  of 
labor  income per return  from  the IRS data. But this procedure  is unsatisfactory,  at least 
for families with more than one income earner. However, the appropriate  data are 
available  directly from the Social Security Administration.  A more difficult  issue con- 
cerns  the extra  benefits  that people get when they "contribute"  more  to social security. 
The marginal  benefit  should  be subtracted  from  the payments  to compute  a net marginal 
tax rate. But these calculations-which depend  on anticipated  benefit  schedules-may 
be difficult.  Some preliminary  results appear  in Gordon  (1982). Measuring the Average Marginal Tax Rate  421 
taxable income?3  In particular,  what is the relation  among  the various 
substitution  effects on people's choices, the explicit tax rates from the 
tax schedule, the marginal  association between taxes and total income 
(which is the Joines-Seater concept of a marginal  tax rate), and the 
average tax rates? 
Consider a family that receives  market income,  Y. This income 
comes partly  from  working  the amount  L at the wage w and  partly  from 
nonlabor  income, I. Hence, total market  income is 
Y=  I  +  wL.  (1) 
Taxes depend on taxable income, yT  =  Y -  D, where D is a broad 
concept of deductions. This concept includes explicit deductions  from 
the tax law (which are either a standard  deduction or the itemized 
amounts  for other taxes, interest, etc.), plus personal  exemptions,  plus 
unreported  income, plus any excess allowances for business and mov- 
ing expenses, plus the preferential  treatment  of deferred  income and 
(real) capital gains, and so on. 
The relation of taxes to taxable income comes from the law, which 
specifies the tax function, 
T =  T(YT),  (2) 
where we assume that the marginal  tax rate from the schedule, T', is 
nonnegative  and nondecreasing-that  is, T'  - 0 and T" :  0 (a "pro- 
gressive" tax). We assume also that T =  0 for yT  .4 
We suppose that deductions-in  our broad sense-depend  first on 
the resources, X,  that people devote to generating  deductions, and 
second on the quantity  of a family's consumption  that  the tax law treats 
favorably. In the United States this category, which we call C2, in- 
cludes owner-occupied  housing, charity, various  activities of state and 
local governments (since state and local taxes are deductible from 
federal taxable incomes), etc. 
We write the function for deductions in the form 
D = f(X)  +  otC2.  (3) 
The first part of the function,  fiX),  satisfies the properties  f'  >  0, f " < 
0, and  f(O)  >  0. Hence, someone who expends no effort generates the 
positive deduction,  fiO). More resources spent on tax avoidance, X, 
generate  more deductions, but at a decreasing  rate.5  We can also think 
3. For a sketch of a related  model, see Heckman  (1983). 
4.  Since 1975, the earned-income  credit makes T' <  0 (and T <  0) for the federal 
individual  income tax over some range  of incomes. We neglect  this element. Some other 
credits can effectively be combined  with deductions  in our subsequent  formulation. 
5. The function  f(X) would  not be concave throughout  if there  were setup  costs associ- 
ated with producing  deductions. At the low end of incomes there is nonconcavity  be- 
cause of the standard  deduction, which is an effort-free  alternative  to itemized deduc- 
tions. 422  Journal of Business 
of the functionflX) as incorporating  the goods equivalent  of any penal- 
ties for tax cheating,  as well as the probability  of being  caught.  Finally, 
we note that for some occupations, such as self-employment,  the ease 
of concealing income and taking excessive business expenses implies 
that deductions,  fAX),  are large for a small amount  of effort. 
The second term in  equation (3),  UC2, describes the  effects of 
favored consumption.  We treat (x  as a positive fraction, since-except 
for some limitations  on the amounts  of charitable  contributions-there 
do not seem to be important  sources of diminishing  effects of favored 
consumption  on deductions. (Business expenses could be entered ex- 
plicitly as another source of deductions in eq. [3]-see  n. 7 below.) 
For some of our results, it matters  that income-either  total or tax- 
able-not  appear  in the function that generates deductions,  f(X). One 
way income might enter is through  the standard  deduction,  which de- 
pends on adjusted  gross income in some years. But this provision  turns 
out to be quantitatively  unimportant  for most purposes, because the 
standard  deduction  varies with income only over a limited  range  at the 
low end of incomes. For example, for 1944-63, the standard  deduction 
is 10%  of adjusted  gross income, but only until the deduction  reaches 
$1,000. (Currently  the standard  deviation  does not depend  on income.) 
In any case, we neglect these features  of the standard  deduction  in our 
analysis. 
Another  possibility  is that the IRS's examination  effort varies with a 
family's adjusted  gross income, as well as with the claimed  amounts  of 
deductions. (It might  depend  also on occupation  and other characteris- 
tics.) Then, depending on the IRS's procedure, someone with more 
adjusted  gross income would  find  it either  easier or harder  to generate  a 
given amount of deductions. That is, some measure  of income would 
appear in the function  f(X).  In fact, our subsequent analysis can be 
used to design an optimal pattern of enforcement  by the IRS, which 
would include a possible dependence of the IRS's effort  on someone's 
income. Although  it would be interesting  to explore this idea, we have 
not yet done so. 
Finally, income might  matter  because of some limitations  on catego- 
ries of itemized deductions. For contributions,  more income means 
more potential deductions. However, for medical.  expenses and now 
for casualty losses an increase in income means that fewer deductions 
can be claimed. Also, there are limitations  on the amounts  of interest 
expense that relate to "investment purposes." Here, an increase in 
someone's income from capital can increase these allowable deduc- 
tions. Miller and Scholes (1978) stress this point. 
In any case, the present analysis does not incorporate  any direct 
effects of income in the function that generates deductions. Later on, 
we note the consequences of including  income in this function. 
Total income goes either to ordinary  consumption,  C1,  favored con- Measuring the Average Marginal Tax Rate  423 
sumption,  C2, taxes, T, or tax avoidance,  X. For expository purposes, 
we do not consider any saving. Hence, the family's budget constraint 
i6 
y  =  Cl  +  C2 +  T + X.  (4) 
The family's utility depends positively on the two types of consump- 
tion and negatively on market  work, L-that  is, 
U  =  U(Cl,  C2, L),  (5) 
where the partial derivatives are U1, U2 >  0, and U3  <  0. Families 
maximize  utility, subject  to the budget  constraint  from  equation  (4), the 
definition  of total market  income from equation  (1), and the determina- 
tion of taxes from  equations  (2) and (3). The resulting  first-order  condi- 
tions can be written as follows:7 
f I =  1T',  (6) 
_  Ut  laL  -  w(1 -  T'),  (7) 
au/ac1 
a  U/aL  =  w(1  -  T')I(1  -  oT').  (8) 
Equation  (6) determines  the amount  of resources, X, that people put 
into tax avoidance. At the margin,  the gain from applying  an extra unit 
of resources is the extra deductions,  f',  multiplied  by the marginal  tax 
rate from the schedule, T'. Hence, people go to the point where the 
marginal  gain, f 'T', equals the marginal  cost, 1. It follows that people 
with a higher  marginal  tax rate, T'-which  will typically  be those with 
higher  total incomes-go  to a lower value off'.  Correspondingly,  they 
spend more resources, X, on avoidance, and end up with more deduc- 
tions, D. 
Equation (7) says that the utility rate of substitution  between ordi- 
nary consumption, C1, and "leisure" equals the after-tax  wage rate, 
where the adjustment  for taxes uses the marginal  rate from the tax 
schedule, T'. Therefore, although people use resources and favored 
consumption  to reduce their taxes, it is still the explicit marginal  tax 
rate from the schedule that affects the allocation between ordinary 
consumption  and leisure. That is because, at the margin,  people have 
6. We do not allow for changes in the relative  prices of C1, C2, or X. Essentially  we 
think  of the various  goods as perfect substitutes  on the supply  side. 
7. As an alternative,  we could write total income as the output of the production 
function,  Y = F(L, B), where  B is "business  expenses," which  could  include  the costs of 
moving.  These business expenses then appear  also in the function  that  generates  deduc- 
tions. In this formulation  the marginal  product  of labor  replaces  the wage, w, in eqq. (7) 
and  (8). We also get the optimization  condition  for business  expenses, (dFlaB)(l  -  T') = 
I -  T' *  (aD/aB),  where  aD/aB  is the marginal  effect of business  expenses on deductions. 
If aDlaB =  1, then aFlaB =  1 applies. 424  Journal of Business 
the option to work an extra unit, earn w on this amount, retain  w(1 - 
T') as additional  disposable income (since X and C2  do not shift at this 
margin),  and spend the funds on C1.8 
On the other hand, when choosing favored consumption,  C2,  house- 
holds consider the marginal  effect, a,  on deductions. Therefore, in 
equation  (8), the utility rate of substitution  between favored consump- 
tion and leisure equals a different  measure  of the after-tax  wage. The 
pertinent  marginal  tax rate here is T'(1 -  a-)/(1  -  oxT'),  which is below 
T' since 0 <  (x <  1 applies. (Viewed alternatively,  the utility rate of 
substitution  between C1  and C2  equals 1 -  aT' because of the preferen- 
tial tax treatment  for C2.) 
Average  Tax Rates and Deductions 
For some purposes, we would like to know how taxes vary cross- 
sectionally with total income, Y. We can think  of the variations  in Y  as 
generated  from underlying  differences  in either nonlabor  income, I, or 
in the wage rate, w. Then we have 
dTIdY =  T'(1  -  dDldY)  =  T'(1 -  f '  dXldY -  a  - dC2IdY) (9) 
=  T'(1 -  lx dC2Id )  -  dXld Y. 
Therefore, the marginal  relation of taxes to income, dTIdY,  is below 
the explicit marginal  tax rate, T', because of the positive relation  be- 
tween income and deductions, dDldY. This last term is positive, first, 
because more income means more effort spent at tax avoidance-that 
is,  dX/dY >  0-and,  second,  because more income means more 
favored consumption-that  is, dC2/dY  > 0. We also find that 0 < dD! 
dY <  1 and hence that 0 <  dTIdY  <  T'. (All of these results follow 
unambiguously  as long as 0 <  dC2/dY  <  I holds.) Finally, we get the 
last expression in equation  (9) by substituting  the condition,  ft  =  lIT', 
from equation (6). 
Consider  how the average tax rate, TIY,  changes with total income, 
Y. Since taxes  are zero until total income reaches some positive 
amount (because some deductions accrue with zero effort), and since 
the marginal  tax rate, T', rises with taxable income, the average tax 
rate tends also to increase with total income. In order  for this possibly 
not to hold throughout,  we need a range  of income where the term dTI 
dY declines with Y. But it is clear from equation (9) that this cannot 
happen if the marginal  relation of deductions to income, dD/dY, is a 
positive constant. Rather,  we need a range  of strong  positive effects of 
income on dD/d  Y  such that the ratio  of deductions  to income, DI  Y, can 
8. Here the results  change  if income has a direct  effect on deductions  (for  reasons  that 
we mentioned  before). If this marginal  effect on deductions  is positive (negative),  then 
the effective marginal  tax rate is below (above) T'. Measuring the Average Marginal Tax Rate  425 
increase with income over some interval. But, the diminishing  returns 
to tax avoidance-that  is, f" < 0-works  against  this. If we neglect the 
role of favored consumption, C2, and look only at the response of the 
effort  for tax avoidance, X, then we tend to get a diminishing  effect of 
income on dD/dY.9  Hence, dT/dY-and,  moreover, the average tax 
rate, T/Y-tend  to increase with total income, Y.10 
There seem to be two main possibilities for reversing this result. 
First, there may be ranges where setup costs for tax avoidance are 
important, so  that the  concavity of  the f-function does  not  hold 
throughout.  Then, there may be regions where DIY  rises with income, 
so that T/Y  may decline. Second, the response of deductions, dD/dY, 
depends also on how favored consumption, C2, reacts to higher in- 
come. If the favored items are luxury  goods or if the demand  for these 
goods becomes increasingly  responsive (positively) to higher  marginal 
tax rates, then the term dD/dY may rise with total income. Then, the 
response of taxes, dT/dY,  conceivably would decline over some range 
(see n. 10 above). 
Overall, it is not easy theoretically to generate positive effects of 
total income on dD/dY. (Empirically, if we measure Y by adjusted 
gross income, then dD/dY appears to be roughly constant as income 
varies cross-sectionally-see  below.) Hence, the term dT/dY-and, 
moreover, the average tax rate, T/Y-are  likely to rise with total in- 
come. 
We focus empirically  on measuring  the marginal  tax rate  from  the tax 
schedule,  T'. This rate governs the  substitution between ordinary 
goods,  C1, and work. But, as mentioned before, some others-for 
example, Joines (1981) and Seater (1982)-attempt  to calculate the 
expression dT/dY.  (Empirically,  they measure Y  by adjusted  gross in- 
come, rather  than by total income, which is unobservable.)  Therefore, 
this alternative  procedure  includes the response of deductions,  dD/dY, 
in the measure of  a  "marginal tax rate." Clearly, this expression 
understates  the marginal  tax rate, T', which applies to the substitution 
between ordinary  goods and work. But we may also be interested in 
the lower marginal  tax rate, T'(1 -  a-)/(1  -  aXT'),  which applies to the 
9. Neglecting  terms  that involve third  derivatives  and ignoring  changes  in C2,  we can 
show from a good deal of algebra  that 
(d/dY)(dD/dYD  =  (T  < 0. 
The terms  involving  third  derivatives  reinforce  this result  if T"'  < 0 andf"'  < 0. The data 
suggest that T"'  0  0 is satisfactory  over a substantial  range of income, with T"'  <  0 
applying in the upper tail. Iff"  -  0 and f  -->  0 as X  ->  oo,  then we must have a range 
where  f"' >  0 applies. 
10. Note that dT/dY  =  T'(1 -  dDldY).  Hence it follows that (d"dY)(dT/dY)  =  -T'( 
dY)(dD/dY)  + T"(1  -  dDldY)2.  Therefore,  since T"  > 0, we know  that  (did )(dTIdY)  > 0 
if (d/dY)(dD/dY)  < 0. 426  Journal of Business 
margin  between favored goods, C2, and work. Under a very special 
condition,  the Joines-Seater  construct, dTIdY,  approximates  an appro- 
priate  weighted  average  of the two marginal  tax rates, T'  and T'(1 -  oc)/ 
(1 -  oLT').  Basically, this happens if the effort for tax avoidance is 
unimportant-in the sense that dXldY  0-and  if favored consump- 
tion is roughly  unit elastic in total income.  11 (Even here we can get into 
trouble when we use adjusted gross income as a proxy for total in- 
come.) Generally,  we cannot directly  use a measure  of dTld  Y  to repre- 
sent the underlying  substitution  effects from taxation. 
Our  results, which focus on the rate from the tax schedule, T', pro- 
vide estimates for one of the interesting marginal  tax rates in the 
theory. But at present we have not figured  out how to measure the 
other marginal tax rate,  T'(1  -  o)/(1  -  axT'). Fundamentally,  this is 
because we lack observable  measures  for avoidance  effort, X, favored 
consumption,  C2, and total income, Y. Conceivably  we may be able to 
go further here by constructing some useful proxies. For example, 
itemized deductions give some information  about favored consump- 
tion. Also,  the expenditures on accountants may tell us something 
about the effort for tax avoidance, X. 
Weighting 
Suppose that we know each family's marginal  income tax rate, Ti, at a 
particular  date. We want to construct an aggregate  index-or  average 
marginal  tax rate-T',  which can be used to understand  some aggre- 
gate behavior. As is usual, we cannot construct a single index that 
works satisfactorily in all contexts. But there are some interesting 
special cases which suggest that it might  be valuable  to constuct some 
indices. 
Assume first that the logarithm  of each family's total consumption 
demand, Ci, depends linearly  on the marginal  tax rate, Ti'-that is,12 
log (C,) =  ai  -  bTi.  (10) 
(We can think  alternatively  of the supply  of goods, Yi,  as depending  on 
T.  .) Now, if everyone's slope coefficient, b, on Ti'  in equation  (10)  is the 
same, then we can readily construct  a useful measure  of average  mar- 
ginal tax rates. This average is a linear combination  of the T. with 
11. The desired  weighted  combination  of marginal  tax rates is presumably  T'  .  C'I(C' 
+ C2) + [T'(1 -  cx)/(l  -  otT')]  *  [C21(C'  + C2)].  The expression  dT/dY  equals  this if dXI 
dY =  0 and dC2IdY =  [C21(C' +  C2)][(1 -  T')I(1 -  oat')]. 
12. Recall that we have abstracted  from saving-hence,  the effect of T. in eq. (10) 
reflects only the substitution  between market  goods and leisure. Possibly, individuals 
perceive their current  marginal  tax rates as permanent,  so that the main  intertemporal 
substitution  effects do not arise. Measuring the Average Marginal Tax Rate  427 
weights equal to C1IC,  where Cis aggregate  consumption-that  is, 
7" =  E  (QI/C)Ti.  (11) 
Here the relation  of aggregate  consumption  to the constructed  average 
marginal  tax rate will reveal the common slope coefficient. Specifi- 
cally, the proportional  response of C to 7"  approximates  the underlying 
coefficient, b. (The result turns out to be approximate  because our 
measures  for changes  in T' pick up some effects from  shifts  in weights.) 
Empirically,  we use shares of adjusted  gross income to proxy for the 
weights by shares of consumption. 
Alternatively,  we might  have that each family's consumption  exhib- 
its a constant elasticity of response to the fraction  of income that they 
keep at the margin, (1 -  Ti). This amounts to postulating  a constant 
elasticity with respect to the after-tax  wage. The form  for consumption 
is then 
log (Ci) =  Ai  +  B *  log (1  -  Ti').  (12) 
Now, if the elasticity, B, is the same for all, then the appropriate  index 
is defined  implicitly  by 
log (1  (C1/c)  log (1 -  T)  (13) 
If we construct the average marginal  tax rate from equation  (13), then 
the elasticity of aggregate  consumption,  C, to the term  (1 -  T')  approx- 
imates the  common elasticity,  B.  Here  the  index  amounts to  a 
geometric  weighted average of the (1 -  Ti').  Because log (1 -  Ti')  is a 
convex function of Ti, the averages computed  from equation (13) ex- 
ceed those found from equation  (11). But empirically,  these two types 
of indices for average marginal  tax rates do not differ  greatly. 
For some purposes-for  example, when measuring  employment  or 
unemployment-we  count numbers  of persons rather  than  amounts  of 
consumption  or income. Then, in the formulas  from equations  (11) or 
(13), we can think of the weight, CI/C, as reflecting  the ith family's 
share of total workers or persons rather than of consumption  or in- 
come. Hence we would be more interested  in person-weighted  average 
marginal  tax rates than in income-weighted  numbers. Operationally, 
we can construct  indices of average marginal  tax rates where the indi- 
vidual  rates are weighted  by numbers  of returns  rather  than  by adjusted 
gross income. The indices weighted  by numbers  of returns  are typically 
much lower than those weighted by adjusted  gross income. 428  Journal of Business 
An Overview of the Data 
Our estimates for marginal  tax rates refer to the federal individual 
income tax, as reported  for each year for 1916-80 in the Internal  Reve- 
nue Service's Statistics of Income. Unfortunately, the data are not 
reported in an entirely consistent manner over time. (This reflects 
either progress or shifting  tastes.) Therefore,  we combine the sources 
into groups by years as indicated below. 
1961-77,  1979-80 
There are tables classified by the highest marginal  tax rates that apply 
to each return. (For 1980, the tables are in Statistics of Income Bulle- 
tin, December 1982.)  These tables show the numbers  of returns  and  the 
adjusted  gross and taxable income that apply  in each class. From these 
tables we can compute average marginal  tax rates, using either shares 
of adjusted  gross income or shares of numbers  of returns  as weights. 
However, we have to make some approximations  in order to take 
account of the maximum  tax rate on earned  income (60%  in 1971,  50% 
for 1972-80). Basically, for those who pay the maximum  tax, we treat 
their marginal  tax rate as 50%  (60%  in 1971)  for all types of income.  13 
However, the overall impact  of the adjustment  for the maximum  tax is 
not too large-for  example, in 1979  only about 4%  of the aggregate  of 
adjusted  gross income applies to returns that use the 50% maximum 
rate on earned income.14 
1954-60 
There are tables classified by ranges of taxable income per return  and 
by filing  status (married/filing  jointly, single, etc.). Using the tax sched- 
ule for each filing status, we can compute the associated marginal  tax 
rate. 5  However, these tables do not provide information  about ad- 
13. The marginal  tax rate on earned income can exceed 50%  because the tax law 
requires  people to allocate itemized deductions  to earned  and unearned  income in pro- 
portion to the amounts of earned and unearned  income. Thus, more earned income 
means less deductions allocated to unearned  income, for which the marginal  tax rate 
could exceed 50%.  Also, an extra dollar  of earned  income may push the marginal  dollar 
of unearned  income into a higher  tax bracket. (For a discussion of these matters, see 
Sunley 1974.) Quantitatively,  these considerations  turn out to be unimportant  for our 
calculations. 
14. Recall that we neglect the earned income credit, which applies since 1975 for 
taxpayers  who have a dependent child. For 1981, the credit rises by 10%  of earned 
income  up to a total earned  income  of $5,000.  Hence, the marginal  tax rate  is -  10%  over 
this range. (People with negative  taxes receive money from  the government.)  Then, the 
credit  is constant  until  earned  income equals  $6,000  but falls by 12/2%  of earned  income 
up to a total of $10,000. In this range someone's marginal  tax rate is 12/2%  plus the 
explicit  rate  from  the tax schedule.  (For  incomes  above $10,000,  the credit  stays at zero.) 
The amount  of earned income credit depends also (negatively)  on the quantity  of un- 
earned  income. 
15. We also make an adjustment  for alternative  tax computations. Measuring the Average Marginal Tax Rate  429 
justed gross income. So, we calculate here only the average marginal 
tax rates when weighted by numbers  of returns. 
1916-43 
The tables are classified by net income, which is roughly taxable in- 
come plus exemptions  for self, spouse, and other dependents.  The tax- 
rate schedules do not depend on marital  status for these years. Within 
each class of net income, we make the approximation  that everyone 
has the same taxable  income-that  is, we neglect variations  in the ratio 
of exemptions to net income. For the purposes of calculating  average 
marginal  tax rates, this approximation  is probably satisfactory. (The 
true dispersion  in exemptions would not be too large and the marginal 
tax rates would be roughly linear, within each class, in taxable in- 
come.) Then, we can calculate marginal  tax rates for each class of net 
income. We also have the data to weight these figures  by numbers  of 
returns and by total income, which corresponds roughly to adjusted 
gross income plus business expenses of individuals.  This weighting  by 
total income approximates  that by adjusted  gross income for the later 
years.  16 
1944-78 
We have tables classified  by ranges  of adjusted  gross income per return 
and by filing status. The tables indicate for each class the amounts of 
taxable  income and tax liabilities.  We can compute  marginal  tax rates  if 
we assume that each taxpayer in a given class has the same taxable 
income. More generally, our averages will be acceptable  if the disper- 
sion of marginal  tax rates within a class is roughly linear in taxable 
income. In any event, we use these computations  only to fill in the 
missing  years from  the other tables. These are 1944-60 and 1978  for the 
indices weighted by adjusted  gross income and 1944-53 and 1978  for 
those weighted  by numbers  of returns.  We fill in the missing  data  based 
on the relation  of the different series over the overlapping  years. The 
high  correlation  during  the overlap suggests  that  this procedure  is satis- 
factory. 
16. There  are interesting  problems  for 1942  and 1943,  which involve the introduction 
of tax withholding  with  the legislation  of January  1943.  In order  to avoid  the payment  of 2 
years' worth  of taxes in 1943,  the government  forgave  roughly  75%  of the tax liability  for 
the year-either  1942  or 1943-for which  an individual's  computed  liability  was smaller. 
Thus, someone's effective marginal  tax rate for either 1942  or 1943  was only about  25% 
of the explicit  rate. For most people, this would  be 1942.  However, although  the possibil- 
ity of tax forgiveness  was discussed before January  1943,  we cannot  say how much  this 
provision  was foreseen when people earned their incomes in 1942. In any event, our 
calculations  for 1942  and 1943  use the explicit tax rate schedules, which disregard  the 
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Nonfilers and Unreported Income 
The IRS data that we use refer  to filed  returns  and to amounts  included 
in adjusted  gross income. But conceptually  our theory allows for gaps 
between a family's total income and the reported  amount  of adjusted 
gross income. Some of these differences are legal, such as the exclu- 
sion from adjusted gross income of nontaxable transfer payments, 
fringe benefits, some contributions  to pension plans, and parts of the 
income from interest or capital gains. Other exclusions are illegal, 
reflecting especially the  unreported income from the underground 
economy. However, the various exclusions from adjusted gross in- 
come do not disturb  the conclusion that the explicit marginal  tax rate 
from the schedule is the substitution  variable  that we wish to measure 
for each family. If we could, we would change the weighting  pattern 
from shares  of adjusted  gross income to shares  of a broader  concept of 
income. But if each family filed an income tax return, we would not 
want to make  an overall adjustment  to account  for the gap between the 
aggregates  of adjusted  gross and total income. 
On the other hand, the data pick up only filed returns. Hence, we 
would like to include the nonfilers  as families (and  incomes) that face a 
zero marginal  tax rate. Therefore, we need estimates for each year of 
the numbers  of families  (and  their  incomes) who do not file tax returns. 
Over the period from 1949 to 1980, the ratio of numbers  of returns 
filed to the Census Bureau's estimate for the total number  of house- 
holds changes very little. Specifically,  as shown in table 1, the ratio is 
1.23 in 1949 and 1.18 in 1980, with a range from 1.14 to 1.25 for the 
intervening  years. (The ratio  can exceed one because some households 
file more than one return and because the census's definition of a 
household does not coincide with the IRS's concept of a filing unit.) 
Therefore,  we assume as an approximation  that the fraction  of families 
that  do not file a return  has not changed  since 1949.  However, since we 
do not know the value of this fraction, we make no adjustment  during 
this period  to account  for nonfilers.  This procedure  will be satisfactory 
if nearly  all families  file a tax return,  as is suggested  by the high  ratio  of 
filed returns  to numbers  of households. But, to the extent that we miss 
some nonfilers, our tax rates will be too high by roughly a constant 
proportion. 
Some recent research  has suggested  that the size of the underground 
economy increased dramatically  during  the 1970s. See O'Neill (1982) 
for a discussion and criticism  of this work. Given this background,  it is 
noteworthy  that the ratio of numbers  of returns  to numbers  of house- 
holds changes little in recent years. If there had been a major  increase 
in the importance  of the underground  economy, then we would have 
expected to see a decline in this ratio. However, the ratio would be 
sensitive only to variations  in the numbers  of families whose full-time Measuring the Average Marginal Tax Rate  431 
TABLE 1  Ratios: Numbers of Returns to Numbers of Households and Adjusted 
Gross Income to Personal Income 
Adjusted  Adjusted 
Gross  Gross 
Income  ?  Income  . 
No.  Returns  .  Personal  No.  Returns  .  Personal 
No.  Households  Income  No.  Households  Income 
1916  .02  .21  1950  1.22  .79 
1917  .15  .24  1951  1.24  .80 
1918  .19  .28  1952  1.24  .80 
1919  .22  .33  1953  1.25  .80 
1920  .30  .36  1954  1.20  .79 
1921  .26  .41  1955  1.21  .80 
1922  .26  .41  1956  1.20  .81 
1923  .29  .42  1957  1.20  .80 
1924  .27  .42  1958  1.16  .78 
1925  .15  .33  1959  1.16  .80 
1926  .15  .32  1960  1.15  .79 
1927  .14  .34  1961  1.14  .79 
1928  .14  .37  1962  1.14  .79 
1929  .14  .36  1963  1.15  .79 
1930  .13  .31  1964  1.16  .80 
1931  .11  .28  1965  1.17  .80 
1932  .13  .30  1966  1.20  .80 
1933  .13  .30  1967  1.21  .80 
1934  .13  .29  1968  1.21  .81 
1935  .15  .29  1969  1.22  .80 
1936  .17  .32  1970  1.17  .78 
1937  .19  .32  1971  1.15  .78 
1938  .19  .32  1972  1.16  .79 
1939  .22  .36  1973  1.17  .78 
1940  .42  .52  1974  1.18  .78 
1941  .72  .67  1975  1.15  .75 
1942  1.00  .70  1976  1.15  .76 
1943  1.19  .71  1977  1.16  .76 
1944  1.27  .71  1978  1.17  .76 
1945  1.33  .71  1979  1.19  .75 
1946  1.38  .76  1980  1.18  .75 
1947  1.41  .79 
1948  1.28  .79 
1949  1.23  .78 
SOURCES.-Numbers  of returns  and  adjusted  gross  income  are  from  Statistics  of Income,  Individual 
Income  Tax  Returns  for each year. Numbers  of households  are  from  Historical  Statistics  of the U.S., 
Colonial  Times  to 1970,  p. 43, and Statistical  Abstract,  various  years. Personal  Income  is from  The 
National  Income  and  Product  Accounts  of the U.S., 1929-76,  and  Economic  Report  of the  President, 
1982.  Values  for 1916-28  are estimated  from  nominal  GNP, based  on the ratio  of personal  income  to 
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market  activities are in the underground  sector. Most people who par- 
ticipate only on a part-time  basis would presumably  file a tax return. 
The ratio of filed returns to numbers  of households is only 0.15 in 
1917  but then rises because of the tax law changes in World  War  I to 
reach 0.30 in 1920. After falling to a range of 0.11-0.15 from 1925  to 
1935, the ratio rises to 0.22 in 1939. Then, the major  increases in the 
coverage of the tax law during  World War II raise the ratio dramat- 
ically to 1.33 by 1945 and 1.41 in 1947. 
Effective 1948, the tax law introduced  a schedule for married  per- 
sons filing  jointly, which differed  from the schedule  for single persons. 
Because of the decreased tendency for married  persons to file sepa- 
rately, the ratio  of returns  filed to the number  of households  (as well as 
the absolute number  of returns)  declines from 1947  to 1949. 
For the period 1916-46, we multiply  the number  of households by 
the value 1.41, which is the ratio of numbers  of returns  to households 
for 1947.  Thus we obtain an estimate for the total number  of potential 
filing units for each year, given the pre-1948  tax law, which did not 
have a separate  schedule for  joint returns.  Here we assume that virtu- 
ally all of the potential  units filed in 1947.  Then we use the numbers  on 
potential filing units when we compute the weights in the formula  for 
average marginal  tax rates (when weighted by numbers of returns). 
Equivalently, we include the estimated number  of nonfilers-the  es- 
timated  number  of potential  filers  less the actual  number  of returns-as 
units that face zero marginal  tax rates. 
Finally, as with the period 1949-80, we make no adjustments  for 
1947-48. That is,  we assume that virtually all potential filing units 
actually filed returns  in these years. 
In order to compute the indices when weighted  by income, we used 
an estimate  for each year of the income-corresponding to the concept 
of adjusted gross income as reported to the IRS-that  accrues to 
nonfilers.  We derive this estimate from the ratio of aggregate  adjusted 
gross income to aggregate  personal income, which appears  in table 1. 
Notice that this ratio does not change greatly from 1946  to 1980. The 
range of variation  is from 0.75 to 0.81, with no clear trend.'7 As an 
approximation,  we make no adjustment  for this period to account for 
the income of nonfilers. 
Before 1946,  we calculate the gap for each year between the ratio of 
adjusted gross to personal income and the mean value, 0.79, which 
applies  from 1946  to 1980.  Then we assume that  this gap  corresponds  to 
the income-equivalent  to adjusted  gross income-for  those families 
that do not file returns.  That is, we estimate the total of adjusted  gross 
17. Note that personal  income includes only a small amount  of unreported  income, 
which  comes from  estimates  by the IRS. (For a discussion, see O'Neill [1982,  pp. 2 ff.].) 
Therefore,  we cannot  use the ratio  of adjusted  gross to personal  income  in order  to infer 
the behavior  of unreported  income. Measuring the Average Marginal Tax Rate  433 
income for each year by multiplying  aggregate  personal income by 
0.79. Then we use this figure when we compute the weights in the 
formula  for average marginal  tax rates (when weighted by amounts  of 
adjusted  gross income). 
Results for Average Marginal Tax Rates 
Table 2 shows our time series of average marginal  tax rates for 1916- 
80. We present four sets of figures,  depending  on whether  the weights 
are by adjusted  gross income or numbers  of returns, and on whether 
the arithmetic  or geometric  averaging  applies. Notice that the last con- 
sideration  makes only a small difference. However, the average mar- 
ginal  tax rates are much lower-by  as much as 10  percentage  points in 
recent years-if  the weighting  is by numbers  of returns  rather  than by 
income. The series that appear  in table 2 involve some piecing  together 
of different  types of underlying  data, as mentioned  before. We provide 
the details in the Appendix. 
For most purposes, the time series weighted by income, rather  than 
by numbers of returns, will be more interesting. Then, because it 
makes little quantitative  difference and because the arithmetic  proce- 
dure corresponds to usual index formulas, we focus our discussion 
now on the series shown in the first column of table 2. This series 
weights by adjusted gross income and uses the arithmetic  form of 
average. The top graph  in figure 1 shows these values of average mar- 
ginal tax rates for 1916-80. The highlights  are as follows. 
From a value of about 1%  in 1916,  the average  marginal  tax rate  rises 
along with major increases in the tax rate schedule to a peak of 5% 
during World War I.  Then, because of a  series of rate reductions 
through  1929  and the declines in income for 1930-31, the marginal  rate 
falls to a low point of less than 2%  in 1931.  Subsequently,  the rate rises 
sharply to reach 5% by 1936. Apparently, the tax rate increases be- 
tween 1932  and 1936  reflect the Hoover-Roosevelt  program  for fighting 
the Depression. In particular,  for 1931, the marginal  tax rates in the 
schedule start at 11/2%,  then rise to a top rate of 25%  for taxable in- 
comes above $100,000. But in 1936  the rate starts at 4%, reaches 62% 
for taxable incomes above $100,000, and hits a top rate of 79% for 
taxable incomes above $5 million. 
From  a value below 6%  in 1940,  the average  marginal  tax rate climbs 
to a peak of 26% during World War II. These changes reflect three 
main  elements: first, reductions  in the levels of income at which taxes 
are positive; second, increases in the regular  tax rates from the sched- 
ule; and third, special levies for the war. Following World  War  II, the 
average  marginal  tax rate declines to a low point of 18%  in 1948-49. 
After  a peak of 25%  during  the Korean  War,  the average  marginal  tax 
rate moves from 22%  in 1954  to 25%  in 1963. Then, the famous Ken- 434  Journal of Business 
TABLE 2  Average Marginal Tax Rates,  1916-80 
Weighted by  Weighted by 
Adjusted Gross Income  Numbers  of Returns 
Year  Arithmetic  Geometric  Arithmetic  Geometric 
1916  .012  .013  .0003  .0003 
1917  .037  .044  .002  .002 
1918  .054  .069  .007  .008 
1919  .052  .066  .006  .007 
1920  .046  .056  .008  .008 
1921  .042  .051  .005  .005 
1922  .046  .055  .005  .005 
1923  .033  .037  .004  .004 
1924  .035  .040  .003  .003 
1925  .030  .032  .002  .002 
1926  .028  .031  .002  .002 
1927  .032  .035  .002  .002 
1928  .041  .044  .002  .002 
1929  .035  .038  .001  .001 
1930  .023  .025  .001  .001 
1931  .017  .018  .001  .001 
1932  .029  .035  .002  .002 
1933  .031  .037  .002  .002 
1934  .034  .040  .004  .004 
1935  .038  .044  .004  .004 
1936  .052  .065  .006  .006 
1937  .046  .057  .006  .006 
1938  .034  .042  .004  .004 
1939  .038  .046  .004  .005 
1940  .056  .070  .008  .009 
1941  .113  .132  .037  .039 
1942  .192  .221  .106  .112 
1943  .209  .248  .183  .191 
1944  .252  .278  .195  .201 
1945  .257  .285  .195  .201 
1946  .226  .250  .141  .147 
1947  .226  .247  .153  .158 
1948  .180  .193  .121  .125 
1949  .175  .187  .119  .123 
1950  .196  .212  .131  .135 
1951  .231  .250  .164  .170 
1952  .251  .268  .181  .188 
1953  .249  .264  .183  .190 
1954  .222  .237  .159  .165 
1955  .228  .244  .164  .169 
1956  .232  .247  .167  .173 
1957  .232  .246  .169  .174 
1958  .229  .243  .167  .172 
1959  .236  .251  .172  .177 
1960  .234  .248  .172  .177 
1961  .240  .254  .174  .180 
1962  .244  .257  .177  .182 
1963  .247  .260  .179  .185 
1964  .221  .230  .156  .161 Measuring the Average Marginal Tax Rate  435 
TABLE 2  (Continued) 
Weighted by  Weighted by 
Adjusted  Gross  Income  Numbers  of Returns 
Year  Arithmetic  Geometric  Arithmetic  Geometric 
1965  .212  .221  .148  .153 
1966  .217  .226  .153  .157 
1967  .223  .232  .157  .161 
1968  .252  .264  .173  .178 
1969  .261  .274  .181  .187 
1970  .243  .254  .168  .174 
1971  .239  .249  .164  .170 
1972  .242  .252  .164  .169 
1973  .250  .260  .170  .176 
1974  .257  .268  .176  .182 
1975  .263  .273  .178  .185 
1976  .273  .283  .185  .193 
1977  .281  .283  .187  .196 
1978  .310  .319  .208  .218 
1979  .289  .302  .190  .199 
1980  .304  .318  .200  .210 
NOTE.-We  discuss  in the text the procedure for weighting by adjusted gross income or by numbers 
of returns. The arithmetic indices  have the form of eq.  (11), while the geometric  ones  correspond  to 
eq. (13). We use the tables from Statistics  of Income,  Individual Income  Tax Returns for each year, as 
discussed  in the  text.  The  Appendix  details  the  procedure  for obtaining the  figures  in the  middle 
periods (1944-60,  1978, when weighted  by adjusted gross income; and 1944-53,  1978, when weighted 
by numbers of returns). 
nedy-Johnson  tax cuts  reduce  the rate to 21% in  1965. Subsequently, 
the growth  in nominal  incomes  and the  Vietnam  surcharge  raise the 
rate  to  25%-26%  for  1968-69.  Then,  following  the  removal  of  the 
surcharge, the effects  of bracket creep increase  the rate steadily from 
24% in 1971 to 31% in 1978. For  1979 the rate falls to 29%, apparently 
because  of  a  widening  in  the  tax  brackets,  although  there  are  no 
changes  in the lowest  and highest  tax rates.  But for  1980 the average 
marginal tax rate rises to 30%. 
The first column  of table  3 and the lower  curve  in figure 1 show  a 
simple  measure  of  an average  tax rate.  This  rate is the  ratio of total 
federal  individual  income  taxes  to the aggregate of personal  income. 
Because  of the graduated rate structure of the tax law and the excess  of 
personal  over  taxable  income,  we  anticipate that this type of average 
tax rate would be below  our measure of the average marginal tax rate. 
Also,  while many changes  in the tax law and in incomes  would gener- 
ate correlated  movements  in the two  measures  of tax rates,  there are 
others-such  as changes in deductibles  versus changes in statutory tax 
rates-that  would produce  substantial divergences. 
Empirically,  the average  tax  rate is 30%-40% of our average  mar- 
ginal rate (37% for  1916-80,  41% for  1946-80,  and 39% for  1970-80). 
But the bulk of the movements  in the two series are parallel. For 1916- 436  Journal of Business 
0.3251 
0.300 






A  0.175-  x 
R 
A  0.150 
T 
E 
0.125-  AVERAGE  TAX  RATE 





1 910  1 920  1 930  1 940  1 950  1 960  1 970  1 980 
FIG.  1.  -Average  marginal  tax rate  and  average  tax rate. (Note: The average 
marginal  tax rate is the arithmetic  index, weighted  by adjusted  gross income, 
from table 2. The average  tax rate appears  in table 3.) 
80, the correlations  between the two are .99 in levels but only .73 in 
first differences. For 1946-80, the comparable  figures  are .88 and .89. 
Some notable differences between the series show up in recent years. 
For example, the average tax rates for 1974 and 1977 are nearly the 
same, but the average marginal  rate for 1977  is 2.4 percentage  points 
higher.  Then, the average  tax rate changes little from 1978  to 1979,  but 
the average marginal  rate falls by about 2 percentage  points. Overall, 
for 1970-80, the correlation  of the average marginal  tax rate with the 
average tax rate is .85 in levels but only .44 in first differences. 
Table 3 shows also the average marginal  tax rates that Joines (1981, 
table 9) calculates for 1929-75. (We use his series that applies to the 
federal  income tax on labor income.) As noted earlier,  Joines attempts 
to measure  the marginal  relation  of taxes to income, dTIdY.  He carries Measuring the Average Marginal Tax Rate  437 
TABLE 3  Other Estimates of Tax Rates 
Average  dT/dY  Average  dT/dY 
Year  Tax Rate  (Joines)  Year  Tax Rate  (Joines) 
1916  .004  .  .  .  1950  .081  .159 
1917  .016  .  .  .  1951  .095  .186 
1918  .018  .  .  .  1952  .102  .190 
1919  .018  .  .  .  1953  .102  .188 
1920  .014  .  .  .  1954  .092  .171 
1921  .013  .  .  .  1955  .095  .176 
1922  .014  .  .  .  1956  .098  .177 
1923  .010  .  .  .  1957  .098  .188 
1924  .010  .  .  .  1958  .095  .182 
1925  .010  .  .  .  1959  .100  .190 
1926  .009  .  .  .  1960  .098  .195 
1927  .011  .  .  .  1961  .101  .194 
1928  .015  .  .  .  1962  .101  .196 
1929  .012  .023  1963  .103  .198 
1930  .006  .018  1964  .095  .178 
1931  .004  .013  1965  .092  .182 
1932  .007  .020  1966  .095  .186 
1933  .008  .028  1967  .100  .189 
1934  .010  .031  1968  .111  .210 
1935  .011  .033  1969  .115  .218 
1936  .018  .047  1970  .101  .205 
1937  .015  .052  1971  .096  .186 
1938  .011  .046  1972  .098  .204 
1939  .012  .046  1973  .102  .219 
1940  .018  .082  1974  .106  .234 
1941  .040  .110  1975  .098  .237 
1942  .072  .174  1976  .102 
1943  .113  .194  1977  .104 
1944  .099  .203  1978  .109 
1945  .100  .208  1979  .110 
1946  .090  .183  1980  .116 
1947  .095  .176 
1948  .074  .142 
1949  .070  .138 
NOTE.-The  average  tax rate equals  the ratio  of total individual  income  taxes (after  credits)  to the 
aggregate of personal income.  The data on taxes are from Statistics  of Income, Individual Income  Tax 
Returns  for each year. For personal  income, see the notes to table 1. The values  for dTIdY  are from 
Joines  (1981,  table 9, the column  labeled  PTL). 
this out by seeing how the tax paid  per return  changes  with the adjusted 
gross income per return  as we move from one class of adjusted  gross 
income to the next.18 Thus, he incorporates  both the effects of the 
marginal  tax rate from the schedule, T', and the positive association  of 
deductions  per return  with income per return.  (Here, deductions  refer 
to the difference  between adjusted  gross and taxable income. The gap 
18. Joines's (1981)  values also weight  by the estimated  fraction  of total  labor  income  in 
each income class, rather  than by adjusted  gross income. 438  Journal of Business 
between adjusted  gross and total income is not considered  because of 
lack of data.) 
Not surprisingly,  Joines's values are below our measures  of average 
marginal  tax rates. For example, for 1970-75  his figures  average  86%  of 
ours, while for 1946-75 the percentage is 81%. The correlations of 
Joines's values with ours for 1946-75 are .91 in levels and .88 in first 
differences. (Before 1946, the adjustment  for nonfilers  means that our 
series and Joines's are not directly comparable.) 
Suppose now that we compare  our average  marginal  tax rates (col. 1 
of table 2) with the average  tax rates and  Joines's values, which appear 
in table 3. Clearly, in terms of the levels of the numbers,  it makes a 
great deal of difference which series one uses. However, because of 
the correlation  among  the series, the choice may be less important  for 
the purpose  of time-series  regression  analysis. But there  are substantial 
differences  in the behavior of all three series over time. Until we em- 
ploy these series for other purposes-for  example, in explaining  the 
behavior of aggregate output and employment-we  cannot be sure 
how important  these differences are. 
The Dispersion  of Marginal  Tax Rates 
We look now at the cross-sectional  dispersion  of marginal  tax rates for 
the recent period, 1961-77, 1979-80. For these years, we have the 
tables that classify directly by the highest marginal  tax rates. Figures 
2-6  show the cumulative  density functions for the marginal  tax rates 
for some selected years, 1961, 1965, 1970, 1975,  and 1980.  In each case 
the upper curve applies to numbers of returns while the lower one 
refers to amounts of adjusted gross income. For example, for 1980, 
figure  6 indicates  that 61%  of the returns  and 29%  of the adjusted  gross 
income are subject to marginal  tax rates that are less than or equal to 
22%. 
Table 4 shows for the period, 1961-77, 1979-80, the standard  devia- 
tions, a, of the marginal  tax rates about their arithmetic  means when 
weighted either by adjusted gross income or by numbers  of returns. 
When weighted by numbers of returns, the standard  deviation rises 
from .084 in 1967  to .125 in 1980.  However, when weighted  by adjusted 
gross income, this pattern shows up only since 1973, where the in- 
crease is from .110 to .129. 
In some simple welfare analyses, the amount  of distortion  depends 
on the square of the tax rate. We can get a crude idea of the change 
over time in this measure  of distortion  by examining  the changes  in the 
mean value of the square of the marginal  tax rate (when weighted by 
amounts  of adjusted  gross income). Table  4 shows that this measure  of 
distortion  falls by about 25%  from 1961  to 1965  but then doubles from Measuring the Average Marginal Tax Rate  439 
1.0 
0.9- 
BASED  ON NUMBERS  OF RETURNS 
-  BASED  ON AMOUNTS  OF ADJUSTED 
GROSS  INCOME  C 












I  0. 4  /  , 
T 
Y 
0.2  ,' 
0.1  , 
0.0 
0.0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9  1.0 
MARGINAL  TAX RATES. 
FIG. 2.-Cumulative  distribution  of marginal  tax rates in 1961. (Note: the 
vertical  axis shows the cumulative  density, corresponding  to each marginal  tax 
rate. The data are from Statistics  of Income,  Individual Income  Tax Returns, 
using  the tables that classify by marginal  tax rates.) 
1965 to 1980. Most of this change derives from variations in the average 
marginal tax rates rather than from shifts in the standard deviations. 
We get a more interesting picture of dispersion when we look at the 
fraction  of  incomes  or returns for  which  the  marginal tax  rates  are 
"high"-that  is, if we look at the weight in the upper tail of the cumu- 
lative densities  that appear in figures 2-6.  This exercise  is interesting 
because some types of tax-avoiding activities-such  as exotic tax shel- 
ters  and  the  heavy  use  of  currency  for  transactions-may  become 440  Journal of Business 
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FIG.  3.-Cumulative  distribution  of marginal  tax rates in 1965. (Note: The 
vertical  axis shows the cumulative  density, corresponding  to each marginal  tax 
rate. The data are from Statistics  of Income,  Individual Income  Tax Returns, 
using the tables that classify by marginal  tax rates.) 
worthwhile  only  at  very  high  marginal tax  rates.  Then,  in order  to 
study these  types  of phenomena,  we would be more interested  in the 
weight in the upper tail of the marginal tax rate distribution rather than 
in the mean or standard deviation  per se. 
Picking 35% arbitrarily as a high marginal tax rate, we see from table 
4 that there have  been  dramatic increases  in the fraction of adjusted 
gross income  or of numbers of returns for which the marginal tax rate 
exceeds  this  number.  Specifically,  the fraction  of  adjusted  gross  in- 
comes  for which  the marginal tax rate exceeds  35% falls from 9% in 
1961 to 8% in 1964 (because  of the Kennedy-Johnson  tax cuts) but then Measuring the Average Marginal Tax Rate  441 
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FiG.  4.-Cumulative  distribution  of marginal  tax rates in 1970. (Note: The 
vertical  axis shows the cumulative  density, corresponding  to each marginal  tax 
rate. The data are from Statistics  of Income,  Individual Income  Tax Returns, 
using the tables that classify by marginal  tax rates.) 
rises to 12%  in 1970, 18% in 1975, and 31% in 1980. In other words,  the 
fraction of income that faces  a marginal tax rate of at least 35% quadru- 
ples from 1964 to 1980! With respect to numbers of returns, the fraction 
falls from  1.2% in  1961 to  1.0% in 1964 but then increases  to 2.2% in 
1970, 4.1% in 1975, and 10.1% in 1980. Hence,  the fraction of returns 
that faces these high marginal tax rates rises by a factor of 10 from 1964 
to 1980. 
Robert  Hall  has  suggested  (in private  conversation)  that the  rapid 
rise in $100 bills in recent years may relate to the sharp increase in the 
fraction  of  income  that faces  high  marginal tax  rates.  (Others  have 442  Journal of Business 
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FIG.  5.-Cumulative  distribution  of marginal  tax rates in 1975. (Note: The 
vertical  axis shows the cumulative  density, corresponding  to each marginal  tax 
rate. The data are from Statistics  of Income,  Individual Income  Tax Returns, 
using the tables that classify by marginal  tax rates.) 
suggested the growth in criminal activity as a cause.)  In particular, the 
fraction of the value of all currency that is in denominations of $100 or 
greater is  highly  stable-varying  only  between  20% and 22%-from 
1944 to 1970.19  But the fraction then increases  sharply to reach 36% for 
July 1980 and 39% for July 1982. 
19. This  behavior  is surprising,  given  the large  increase  in prices  and  real  incomes.  For 
some reason, the average  denomination  of currency  outstanding  (total dollar  value di- 
vided by total number  of bills) does not change  much over this period.  The sources for 
our data  on currency  denominations  are the Board  of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve 
System,  Banking  and  Monetary  Statistics,  p.  415; Banking  and  Monetary  Statistics, Measuring the Average Marginal Tax Rate  443 
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FIG. 6.-Cumulative  distribution  of marginal  tax rates in 1980. (Note: The 
vertical  axis shows the cumulative  density, corresponding  to each marginal  tax 
rate.  The data  are  from  Statistics  of Income Bulletin, December  1982, using  the 
tables that classify by marginal  tax rates.) 
The Behavior  of Deductions 
Figures  7-11 show the cross-sectional  relation  of deductions  per return 
to adjusted  gross income per return  (for  all filing  statuses)  for the years 
1961, 1965, 1970, 1975, and 1980. Recall that our concept of deduc- 
1941-1970,  pp. 622 ff.; Annual Statistical  Digest, 1970-1979, p. 552; and U.S. Depart- 
ment of the Treasury, Monthly Statement of  U.S.  Currency  and Coin, Form 1028, 
various issues. 444  Journal of Business 
.og  N  ^  to  N  t  x  o  ^  x  t  s  * 
N  t 
W  v)  ^  N  N N N  ^  t  m  iD  .  b  O  Nt 
;.  L  .  \  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
^~~~~~  m  b  c  oco xxm  ocoo0 
~~~~a-,_  -  "  "t  W  r-  (  =ss 
Z~  ~~<  (=--  --- 
.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .o 
M~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
.  v  .  z  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .S Measuring the Average Marginal Tax Rate  445 



















0  5  10  15  20  25  30  35  40  45  50  55  60  65 
ADJ.  GROSS  INCOME  PER RETURN 
($ 1000s) 
FIG.  7.-Deductions  per return  vs. adjusted  gross income per return  in 1961. 
(Note: The data are from Statistics  of Income,  Individual Income  Tax Returns, 
using the tables that classify by adjusted  gross income per return.) 
tions,  which  refers to the difference  between  adjusted gross  and tax- 
able  income,  includes  exemptions  but excludes  the  various  subtrac- 
tions from total income  that precede  the calculation  of adjusted gross 
income.  The figures consider  the range of adjusted gross  income  per 
return up to $70,000. 
The  data  do  not  suggest  much  tendency  for  the  slope  dDIdY  to 
change  with income  once  adjusted gross  income  exceeds  a fairly low 
amount, which is $5,000-$10,000  between  1961 and 1980.20  In fact, this 
appearance  of  a roughly  linear relation  between  deductions  and ad- 
20. If we look only at itemized  deductions  (excluding  standard  deductions  and  exemp- 
tions), then the slope increases at the low end of incomes. But the relation  between 
itemized deductions  per return  and adjusted  gross income per return  is again roughly 
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FIG. 8.-Deductions  per return  vs. adjusted  gross income  per return  in 1965. 
(Note: The data are from Statistics  of Income,  Individual Income  Tax Returns, 
using the tables that classify by adjusted  gross income per return.) 
justed gross income holds up if we add the upper tail of income.  (At the 
low  end,  the  slope  decreases  with  adjusted  gross  income.)  For  the 
years  shown  in the  figures,  which  range from  1961 to  1980, and for 
values  of  adjusted  gross  income  that exceed  $10,000,  the  estimated 
slopes  dDIdY  are in the  interval  between  .16 and  .18.  That is,  once 
adjusted gross  income  is greater than $5,000-$10,000,  deductions  per 
return are roughly a positive  intercept plus 16%-18% of adjusted gross Measuring the Average Marginal Tax Rate  447 
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FIG.  9.-Deductions  per return  vs. adjusted  gross income per  return  in 1970. 
(Note: The data  are from  Statistics of Income, Individual  Income Tax  Returns, 
using the tables that classify by adjusted  gross income per return.) 
income  per return. (Of course,  we  cannot  say how adjusted gross in- 
come  per return relates  to total income  per return-presumably  most 
of the serious tax avoidance  precedes  the calculation of adjusted gross 
income.) 
Recall  that  the  marginal relation  of  taxes  to  income  is  dTIdY= 
T'(1  -  dDldY). Therefore, if dDIdY is roughly constant-as  appears to 
be  true  if  we  measure  Y by  adjusted  gross  income-then  dT/dY is 
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($lOOs) 
FIG.  10.-Deductions  per return vs.  adjusted gross income per return in 
1975. (Note: The data are from Statistics of Income, Individual  Income Tax 
Returns, using the tables that classify by adjusted  gross income per return.) 
ticular, if dDIdY lies  between  .16 and .18, then dTIdY is 82%-84% of 
T'. In fact, for the post-World  War II period, this relation accounts for 
most of the difference  in average levels  between  Joines's  estimates  of 
dTIdY (see  table 3) and our figures on average marginal tax rates.  For 
1970-75,  his values  average  86% of ours,  while for  1946-75  they  are 
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FIG.  11.-Deductions  per return vs.  adjusted gross income per return in 
1980. (Note: The data are from Statistics of Income, Individual  Income Tax 
Returns, using the tables that classify by adjusted  gross income per return.) 
Concluding  Remarks 
Our time series on average marginal  tax rates should be useful for a 
variety of research  purposes. But our own plans-and  our initial  moti- 
vation for constructing  the series-focus  on two areas. First, we plan 
to use the data on average  marginal  tax rates in a study of the effects of 
government policies on aggregate output, employment, and so on. 
Some previous work on this topic stresses the influences  of monetary 
disturbances  and of various  types of government  purchases.  (See, e.g., 450  Journal of Business 
Barro 1981.) Now  we  can add a measure of the average marginal tax 
rate to assess  this aspect  of fiscal policy.  Conceivably  we may also be 
able to distinguish temporary changes  in marginal tax rates from per- 
manent ones.  Then, the temporary changes involve  intertemporal sub- 
stitution effects,  which do not arise for the permanent changes.  Hence 
we can test for a different impact of temporary versus permanent shifts 
in marginal tax  rates  on  output,  employment,  and  other  macroeco- 
nomic variables. 
Second,  a theory  of public debt creation,  outlined in Barro (1979), 
includes  the  intertemporal  behavior  of  tax  rates.  Specifically,  this 
theory suggests  that debt management smooths tax rates over time, in 
spite  of  fluctuations  in  government  spending  and  aggregate  real  in- 
come.  In order to test this theory fully, we need the time-series data on 
average marginal tax rates. 
Finally, as mentioned before,  the present series on average marginal 
tax rates is incomplete  because  it refers only to the federal individual 
income tax. We plan some extensions,  at least to incorporate the social 
security  tax  and  some  other  levies.  At  this  point,  we  are uncertain 
about how far we  can go in constructing  a comprehensive  measure of 
the average marginal tax rate. 
Appendix 
Table  Al shows estimates  of average  marginal  tax rates  for 1944-78, based on 
the tables that classify by ranges of adjusted gross income per return. We 
indicated  in the text our procedure  for estimating  the marginal  tax rate within 
each class. Then we weight either  by adjusted  gross income or by numbers  of 
returns and use either the arithmetic  or geometric formula to generate the 
figures  shown in the table. 
We use the values in table Al to fill in our missing  data as follows. For the 
cases where we weight by adjusted  gross income, we get the arithmetic  values 
for 1944-60 from the equation -.021  +  1.093  (value from table Al).  The 
coefficients come from a regression of the values shown in table 2 on those 
shown  in table  Al over the period 1961-70. For the geometric  form, we use the 
equation  -  .020 + 1.071  *  (value  from  table  Al). In both cases the R2 values  for 
the regressions  are nearly .99. For 1978,  we get the arithmetic  value from the 
equation -  .019 +  1.112 *  (value from  table Al). These coefficients  come from 
a regression  over the period 1971-77. Similarly,  for the geometric  value, we 
use the equation -.005  +  1.045 * (value from table Al).  In these cases the 
values of R2 are .98. 
We use an analogous  procedure  for the cases where we weight by numbers 
of returns. Here we get the missing data for 1944-53 by using regression 
equations  that are estimated  over the period 1954-70. For the arithmetic  case 
the equation  is -  .004 +  1.034  (value  from  table Al). For the geometric  case 
the equation  is -.004  +  1.037 * (value from table Al).  In these cases the R2 
values exceed .99. We get the missing  data for 1978  from regressions  that are 
estimated over the period 1971-77. For the arithmetic  case the equation is Measuring the Average Marginal Tax Rate  451 
TABLE Al  Estimates of Average Marginal Tax Rates for 1944-78 
Weighted by  Weighted by 
Adjusted Gross  Income  Numbers of Returns 
Year  Arithmetic  Geometric  Arithmetic  Geometric 
1944  .250  .278  .192  .198 
1945  .254  .285  .192  .198 
1946  .226  .252  .140  .146 
1947  .226  .249  .151  .157 
1948  .184  .198  .121  .125 
1949  .180  .193  .118  .122 
1950  .198  .216  .130  .135 
1951  .231  .252  .163  .168 
1952  .249  .269  .179  .185 
1953  .247  .265  .181  .187 
1954  .222  .239  .158  .163 
1955  .228  .246  .162  .167 
1956  .231  .249  .166  .171 
1957  .232  .249  .167  .173 
1958  .229  .245  .164  .170 
1959  .236  .253  .169  .174 
1960  .234  .250  .169  .175 
1961  .239  .257  .171  .176 
1962  .240  .257  .174  .179 
1963  .243  .260  .176  .181 
1964  .222  .234  .154  .159 
1965  .214  .225  .147  .151 
1966  .219  .230  .152  .156 
1967  .226  .238  .156  .160 
1968  .251  .266  .171  .176 
1969  .261  .276  .180  .186 
1970  .240  .252  .166  .172 
1971  .231  .242  .161  .166 
1972  .235  .246  .160  .166 
1973  .243  .254  .166  .172 
1974  .252  .264  .173  .179 
1975  .253  .265  .167  .175 
1976  .263  .276  .176  .184 
1977  .269  .283  .175  .183 
1978  .295  .310  .193  .203 
NOTE.-The data are from Statistics of Income, Individual  Income Tax  Returns  for each year, 
using  the tables  that  classify  by adjusted  gross income  per  return.  See the notes to table  2 in the text. 
-  .054  +  1.361  (value from table Al).  For the geometric case the equation is 
-.050  +  1.323  (value from table Al).  Here  the R2 values  are .88 and .93, 
respectively. 
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